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INTRODUCTION
"A river is more than an amenity, it is a treasure, it offers a necessity of life
that must be rationed among those who have power over it."
... Justice Holmes in New Jersey v. New York,
283 U.S. 336, 342 (1921).
When a dispute arises between states over the use of water in an
interstate stream, the United States Supreme Court has employed the
doctrine of equitable apportionment to resolve the dispute. Equitable
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apportionment requires the Court to determine the respective state's
rights to the use and benefit of the interstate water. A recurrent
theme in equitable apportionment suits is the concept of injury. The
focus of the Court's analysis is to apportion the water so that each
state receives maximum benefit from the use of the water with mini-
mal injury to the other state. Typically, the Court has used a balanc-
ing test in dealing with competing demands on an over-appropriated
water supply.
Early Supreme Court apportionment cases established the doctrine
of equitable apportionment, relying mainly on state water law princi-
ples. Subsequent cases expanded the principles of apportionment to
include not only the respective state's water laws, but considerations
of dependent economies, climatic conditions, conservation measures,
and an in-depth analysis of the benefits and burdens of large-scale di-
versions and their impact on existing uses. Apportionment decrees
have become more complex as a result of the Court's multi-factored
analysis. Although there are identifiable factors in the apportionment
analysis, each case has been decided on an ad hoc basis, dependent
upon the particular facts of the dispute.
This Comment will review the constitutional basis of the doctrine
of equitable apportionment and will discuss the legal principles and
public policy considerations underlying the equitable apportionment
decisions of the United States Supreme Court. The Comment will
then examine the background and resolution of the North Platte
River dispute that gave rise to the Court's equitable apportionment
decree in Nebraska v. Wyoming.1 Finally, a discussion of the events
preceding Nebraska's petition to reopen the North Platte River De-
cree and an analysis of issues in the new controversy based on previ-
ous equitable apportionment cases will be presented.
I. EQUITABLE APPORTIONMENT
A. Forum and Constitutional Basis
The United States Constitution gives the Supreme Court original
jurisdiction in disputes between states.2 The statute3 implementing
the constitutional provision provides that suits by one state against an-
other are within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court.4 Since the states of the union are not free to wage war upon
1. 325 U.S. 589 (1945)
2. U.S. Const art. III, § 2, c. 2, provides in pertinent part, "In all Cases affecting
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State
shall be a Party, the Supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction."
3. The statute states in pertinent part, "Original jurisdiction. (a) The Supreme
Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all controversies between
two or more States.... " 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1982).
4. The usual tests of case or controversy, standing, political questions, and the like
1987]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
each other, the need for the Court to act as a neutral tribunal is obvi-
ous. Controversies between states, which when the States were in-
dependent would have been resolved by force or diplomatic
negotiation, are now peacefully settled by the Court.5 No consent of
the state is required. States are deemed to have consented to original
jurisdiction by virtue of the fact that they have adopted the Constitu-
tion, which grants jurisdiction of controversies between two or more
states.6
In petitioning the Court to accept original jurisdiction, a state must
bring the suit in parens patriae in order to overcome an eleventh
amendment challenge.7 Thus, the inquiry by the Court is whether the
state is suing to protect interests beyond the protection of private
rights.8 "Parens patriae works because equitable apportionment suits
do not greatly strain the fiction that the state is asserting a sovereign
interest separate from the protection of private water rights."9
A Special Master is appointed once the Court accepts jurisdiction.
The role of the Master is to collect evidence, preside over hearings,
take expert testimony and report the findings to the Court.10 The
Court, not the Master, enters judgment in the case. Usually, the find-
ings of the Master are given deference by the Court.11
are applicable. See generally C. Wright, Law of Federal Courts § 109, at 765 (4th
ed. 1983).
5. Id. at 766.
6. Id.
7. [S]tates have been permitted to invoke the original jurisdiction in the
capacity of parens patriae, asserting claims independent of those predi-
cated upon the state's proprietary interests. As parens patriae the state
has been described as 'guardian of the health, welfare and prosperity of
its inhabitants.' The circumstances leading to recognition of a state as
parens patriae arise from injury to the collective interests of a state's
citizens, but the right to sue as parens patriae itself is independent of
and behind' those interests.
Note, The Original Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court, 11 Stan. L
Rev. 665, 671-72 (1959) (footnotes omitted).
8. Tarlock, Law of Equitable Apportionment Revisited, Updated, and Restated, 56
UNIV. COLO. L. REV. 381, 389-90 (1985).
9. Id. at 389.
10. Fed. R Civ. P. 53.
11. The reason the Court usually gives considerable deference to factual findings of
Special Masters is that the record in equitable apportionment cases is usually
lengthy, complex, and technical. The reason for deference is best illustrated by
the following two examples: In Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907), the Spe-
cial Master spent six years collecting evidence, resulting in 8,559 pages of testi-
mony, 122 exhibits and 347 witnesses. In Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589
(1945), the Master was appointed in 1935 and submitted his final report in 1945.
The record constituted 29,500 pages of testimony and 1,288 exhibits. The Master's
Report alone was 273 pages long. On June 22, 1987, the Court appointed Owen




B. Federal Common Law
The doctrine of equitable apportionment 12 is a form of federal com-
mon law.13 The concept of a federal common law in the context of
resolving interstate water disputes is attributed to Justice Brandeis in
Hinderlider v. LaPlata River & Ch7erry Creek Ditch Co.14 "For
whether the water of an interstate stream must apportioned between
the two States is a question of 'federal common law' upon which
neither the statutes nor the decisions of either State can be
conclusive."15
Equitable apportionment is federal common law because it is court
created by a federal court, the United States Supreme Court.16 In
Kansas v. Colorado,17 Chief Justice Fuller remarked "[s]itting, as it
were, as an international, as well as a domestic, tribunal, we apply
Federal law, state law, and international law, as the exigencies of the
particular case may demand."' 8 Thus, the Court looks to a number of
sources and factors in attempting to equitably apportion water rights
between two contending states.
Implicit in the apportionment cases is the realization that each
state has a federal common law right to use interstate waters, but usu-
12. Two other methods exist in resolving disputes over interstate waters: Congres-
sional apportionment and interstate compacts. Congressional apportionment was
first announced by the Court in Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963). In Ari-
zona, several states were unable to agree on a water division. Congress, appar-
ently relying on its power over navigable waters, forced an apportionment on the
states and the Court held that the Congressional scheme was controlling. The
second method of resolving interstate water disputes is the interstate compact.
Interstate compacts are agreements made between states with the consent of
Congress. The interstate compact, while offering a superior method of settling
interstate water disputes, is limited in its use by the difficulty of obtaining the
consent of all the interested states and the Congress. Note, The Retrogressive Ap-
plication of Equitable Apportionment In Colorado v. New Mexico, 104 S.Ct2433
(1984) - An Ill-Timed Burdening of "The Flexible Doctrine", 18 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 771, 775 n.46 (1985).
13. "The common law includes those principles, usages, and rules of action applicable
to the government and security of persons and property, which do not rest for
their authority upon any express and positive declaration of the will of the legis-
lature." Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 96 (1907).
14. 304 U.S. 92 (1938).
15. Id. at 110.
16. 2 R Clark, WATER AND WATER RIGHTs § 132.3 at 325 n.91 (1967). Professor Clark
points out that on the same day that Hinderlider was decided, Justice Brandeis,
in Erie 1R Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938), said, "There is no federal gen-
eral common law. Congress has no power to declare substantive rules, of common
law applicable in a state whether they be local in their nature or 'general'....
And no clause in the Constitution purports to confer such a power upon the fed-
eral courts."
17. 206 U.S. 46 (1907).
18. Id. at 97 (quoting Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125, 146-47 (1922)).
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ally not to the complete exclusion of another state.19 However,
"equality of right' refers.., not to an equal division of the water, but
to the equal level or plane on which all the states stand, in point of
power and right, under our constitutional system." 20 The states,
therefore, come before the Court on equal footing and the Court must
carefully weigh the interests of each state in resolving the dispute.
C. Principles of Standing
In an equitable apportionment case, the complaining state must
meet a high standard of proof of injury in order for the Court to in-
voke jurisdiction. The following cases illustrate the requisite standard
of proof in an equitable apportionment action.
1. Missouri v. Illinois21
Missouri v. Illinois was the first case to set a high standard of in-
jury as a prerequisite to Supreme Court relief. Missouri brought an
original action to enjoin Illinois from discharging sewage from Chi-
cago into the Illinois River, a tributary of the Mississippi.2 2 Missouri
contended that the common law rule granting a riparian23 the right to
the flow of a stream unimpaired in quality and quantity should con-
trol, thus entitling the state to an injunction. The Supreme Court,
however, refused to grant Missouri an injunction due to the fact that
Missouri had not met its burden of proof. "Before this court ought to
intervene the case should be of serious magnitude clearly and fully
proved, and the principle to be applied should be one of which the
19. In Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 96 (1907), the Court remarked: "One cardinal
rule, underlying all the relations of the states to each other, is that of equality of
right. Each state stands on the same level with all the rest. It can impose its own
legislation on no one of the others, and is bound to yield its own views to none."
20. Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 465 (1922) (citation omitted).
21. 200 U.S. 496 (1906).
22. Id. at 517.
23. There are two basic doctrines governing water rights: the riparian doc-
trine, recognized largely by states east of the hundredth meridian and
the doctrine of prior appropriation, recognized in most of the western
states.
The riparian doctrine has two distinct theories of water use: the nat-
ural flow theory and the reasonable use theory. Under the former, ripa-
rian landowners may use the waters of a stream so long as that use does
not affect either the quantity or quality of the streamflow. The realon-
able use throry entitles riparians to the reasonable use of the streaiifflow
for normal consumptive purposes and the discharge of wastes.
Under the prior appropriation doctrine, water rights may be acquired
by diverting water and using it for a beneficial purpose. The rule of pri-
ority determines the relative rights of appropriators, whose appropria-
tions are ranked in the order of their seniority. 1 W. HUTCHINS, WATERS
AND WATER RIGHTS §§ 16, 18, 19 (1967).
Comment, Colorado v. New Mexico II: Judicial Restraint in the Equitable Appor-
tionment of Interstate Waters, 62 DEN. U.L.REv. 857, 858 n.11 (1985).
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court is prepared deliberately to maintain against all considerations on
the other side."24
2. Connecticut v. Massachusetts 25
In Connecticut v. Massachusetts, the Court considered for the first
time an interstate water dispute between two riparian states. Con-
necticut sued to prohibit the diversion of water from two tributaries of
the Connecticut River to the city of Boston.26 Connecticut contended
that the proposed diversion would divert water out of the watershed,
impair the navigability of the Connecticut River, and take flood wa-
ters which agricultural interests relied on for irrigation pur-
poses.27Connecticut also argued that since both were riparian doctrine
states the riparian doctrine's natural flow theory should be the guid-
ing principle in the Court's decision. 28 The Court declined to strictly
apply the riparian rule reasoning that although local water law is a
persuasive consideration, "federal, state and international law is to be
considered and applied... as the exigencies of the particular case may
require."29 The Court refused to issue the injunction noting3O " this
Court will not exert its extraordinary power to control the conduct of
one State at the suit of another, unless the threatened invasion of
rights is of serious magnitude and established by clear and convincing
evidence."S1
3. Nebraska v. Wyoming32
In Nebraska v. Wyoming, Nebraska brought an original action al-
leging that irrigators in Colorado and Wyoming were violating the
rule of prior appropriation in force in the three states and asked the
Court to equitably apportion the waters of the North Platte River.3 3
The Court denied Colorado's motion to dismiss 34 over a vigorous dis-
sent by Justice Roberts.35 Justice Douglas, writing for the majority,
24. Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 521 (1906).
25. 282 U.S. 660 (1931).
26. Id. at 662.
27. Id. at 663.
28. Id. at 669-70.
29. Id. at 670.
30. The Court also denied relief in two other equitable apportionment actions. Colo-
rado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383 (1943); Washington v. Oregon 297 U.S. 517 (1936).
31. Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 669 (emphasis added).
32. 325 U.S. 589 (1945).
33. Id. at 591-92.
34. Id. at 607-11. Colorado argued that the evidence did not show that there was a
serious detriment to Nebraska water users. Further, Colorado asserted that a po-
tential threat of injury was not sufficient to meet the applicable test of substantial
and imminent injury.
35. Justice Roberts was joined in dissent by Justice Frankfurter and Justice Rut-
ledge. The dissent argued that Nebraska had not shown actual or immediately
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noted that the dependable natural flow of the river during the irriga-
tion season had long been over-appropriated.S6 Douglas also found it
persuasive that the States had not been able to negotiate an agree-
ment, that the areas involved were arid or semi-arid and that depriva-
tion of water in those areas could not help but be injurious.37 The
majority, analogizing to the Court's previous decision in Wyoming v.
Colorado,38 said, "There the only showing of injury or threat of injury
was the inadequacy of the supply of water to meet all appropriative
rights. As much if not more is shown here."39Thus, in Nebraska v. Wy-
oming sufficient proof of injury was found in the fact that the North
Platte historically had been over-appropriated and any new diversion
would add to the problem.40
D. Balancing the Equities
In equitable apportionment cases, the Court seeks to apportion the
water with a sense of fairness to both states so that each state benefits
from the use of the water. Although equitable apportionment cases
are few, some broad principles have emerged. The issue to be resolved
is whether the benefit received by a state diverting water from an in-
terstate stream outweighs the harm done to the complaining state. As
demonstrated by case law, the equitable apportionment doctrine has
been applied in a flexible manner, with each case determined on its
particular facts.41
In Nebraska v. Wyoming,42 Justice Douglas considered the nature
and amount of return flows, climatic conditions, environmental fac-
tors, the importance of established uses, economies dependent upon
regular supplies of water, the amount of waste, and the availability of
threatened damage of substantial magnitude in order to be granted relief. The
dissent's argument was based in part on the following quotation from the
Master's report: "The statistics, taken all in all, are, to say the least, inconclusive
as to the existence or extent of damage to Nebraska by reason of the drought or
by reason of any deprivation of water by wrongful uses in Wyoming or Colorado."
Id. at 661-62 (Roberts, J., dissenting). In what has proven to be a prophetic state-
ment, Justice Roberts observed: "I am sure that, on the showing in the present
record, none of the states is entitled to a declaration of rights. The precedent now
made will arise to plague this court not only in the present suit but in others. Id.
at 657-58 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 608.
37. Id. at 610.
38. 259 U.S. 419 (1922).
39. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 610 (1945).
40. The Court held, "[W]here the claims to the water of a river exceed the supply, a
controversy exists appropriate for judicial determination." Id.
41. See Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 464 (1922). The Court apportions the
available water based on "the particular facts disclosed and the local law of the
two states."
42. 325 U.S. 589 (1945).
[Vol. 66:734
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storage water.4 3 The Supreme Court has recently held that it is appro-
priate to consider whether reasonable conservation measures in the
downstream state might negate any injuries suffered by the upstream
diversion.44 Thus, the Court engages in a multi-factored analysis in bal-
ancing the competing interests of the respective states.
E. Emergence of the Doctrine
1. Kansas v. Colorado45
The United States Supreme Court first announced its power to eq-
uitably apportion an interstate stream in Kansas v. Colorado. In that
case, Kansas brought an original action to restrain Colorado appropri-
ators from diverting waters from the Arkansas River.46 Kansas ar-
gued it had a right to the natural and customary flow of the river
under the natural flow theory of the riparian doctrine.47 Colorado, an
appropriation doctrine state, claimed it had a sovereign right to use
the river's entire flow for its entire benefit, regardless of any injury
such use might cause downstream users.48 Because each state had re-
jected the water rights doctrine adopted by the other, the Court de-
clined to resolve the dispute by strictly applying the principles of
either doctrine.49 The Court, however, noted that some appropriation
principles were recognized under Kansas law.50 After reviewing the
43. Apportionment calls for the exercise of an informed judgment on a consideration
of many factors. Priority of appropriation is the guiding principle. But physical
and climatic conditions, the consumptive use of water in the several sections of
the river, the character and rate of return flows, the extent of established uses,
the availability of storage water, the practical effect of wasteful uses on down-
stream areas, the damage to upstream areas as compared to the benefits to down-
stream areas if a limitation is imposed on the former-these are all relevant
factors. Id. at 618.
44. Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 187-88 (1982) (footnote omitted).
Under some circumstances... the countervailing equities supporting a
diversion for future use in one State may justify the detriment to ex-
isting users in another State. This may be the case, for example, where
the State seeking a diversion demonstrates by clear and convincing evi-
dence that the benefits of the diversion substantially outweigh the harm
that might result. In the determination of whether the State proposing
the diversion has carried this burden, an important consideration is
whether the existing users could offset the diversion by reasonable con-
servation measures to prevent waste. This approach comports with our
emphasis on flexibility in equitable apportionment and also accords suf-
ficient protection to existing uses.
45. 206 U.S. 46 (1907)
46. Id. at 47.
47. Id. at 58-60.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 104-05.
50. Id. at 104-05. "As Kansas thus recognizes the right of appropriating the waters of
a stream for the purposes of irrigation, subject to the condition of an equitable
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evidence, the Court acknowledged that the Colorado diversions had
caused some perceptible injury but concluded that the benefits of the
diversions to Colorado outweighed the injury to Kansas.51 Due to the
fact that Kansas was unable to prove substantial injury under either
riparian or appropriation principles, there was no reason to enjoin
Colorado's appropriation.
F. Equitable Apportionment Applied
1. Wyoming v. Colorado52
In Wyoming v. Colorado, the Court first considered the role of a
common water law doctrine in an equitable apportionment action.
This case also marks the first time the Court's application of equitable
apportionment principles resulted in an actual division of water in an
interstate river between two contending states.53 Both Colorado and
Wyoming had adopted the doctrine of prior appropriation for water
rights. 54 Wyoming brought suit against Colorado and two Colorado
corporations to enjoin the defendants from diverting water from the
Laramie River.5 5 Wyoming argued that diverters in Wyoming had
prior and superior right to the water and that Colorado's proposed di-
version would not leave enough water in the river to satisfy the senior
division between the riparian proprietors, she cannot complain if the same rule is
administered between herself and a sister state."
51. Id. at 113-14.
[T]he diminution of the flow of water in the river by the irrigation of
Colorado has worked some detriment to the southwestern part of Kan-
sas, and yet when we compare the amount of this detriment with the
great benefit which has obviously resulted to the counties in Colorado, it
would seem that equality of right and equity between the two states for-
bids any interference with the present withdrawl of water in Colorado
for purposes of irrigation.
52. 259 U.S. 419 (1922).
53. The Court also has made an actual division of water in two other cases. Nebraska
v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945). See infra pp. 814-818 and accompanying notes.
In New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336 (1921), the Court apportioned the
waters of the Delaware River between New Jersey and New York. In much
quoted language, Justice Holmes noted:
A river is more than an amenity, it is a treasure. It offers a necessity of
life that must be rationed among those who have power over it. New
York has the physical power to cut off all the water within its jurisdic-
tion .... [T]he exercise of such a power to the destruction of the interest
of lower States could not be tolerated .... [E]qually little could New
Jersey be permitted to require New York to give up its power altogether
in order that the river might come down to it undiminished. Both states
have real and substantial interests in the river that must be reconciled as
best they may be. The different traditions and practices in different parts
of the country may lead to varying results but the effort always is to
secure an equitable apportionment without quibbling over formulas.
Id. at 342-43 (emphasis added).
54. Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 467 (1922).
55. Id. at 455.
[Vol. 66:734
1987] EQUITABLE APPORTIONMENT 743
water rights.56
After finding that both states had adopted the doctrine of prior ap-
porpriation, the Court held there was neither a need to balance com-
peting state interests nor a need to develop new principles of equitable
apportionment since both states followed nearly identical laws. The
doctrine of prior appropriation "furnishes the only basis which is con-
sonant with the principles of right and equity applicable to such a con-
troversy as this is.,,7 The analysis of the Court in Wyoming v.
Colorado led Professor Robert Clark to remark:
(W)hen litigant states follow substantially identical laws, the Supreme Court
can avoid the search for a reason to prefer the law of one state over that of
another, or the usually more difficult task of shaping a rule different from
that which any of the litigant states apply internally. The solution is substan-
tially to ignore the existence of a state boundary.
5 8
Several considerations persuaded the Court to apply the prior ap-
propriation doctrine interstate.
Each of these States applies and enforces this rule in her own territory, and it
is the one to which intending appropriators naturally would turn for guidance.
The principle on which it proceeds is not less applicable to interstate streams
and controversies than to others. Both States pronounce the rule just and
reasonable as applied to the natural conditions in that region; and to prevent
any departure from it the people of both incorporated it into their constitu-
tions. It originated in the customs and usages of the people before either State
came into existence, and the courts of both hold that their constitutional pro-
visions are to be taken as recognizing the prior usage rather than as creating a
new rule. These considerations persuade us that its application to such a con-
troversy as is here presented cannot be other than eminently just and equita-
ble to all concerned.5 9
The Court found that senior Wyoming appropriators held 181,500
acres of land. The Court then determined that the amount of water
reasonably required to irrigate that amount of land was 272,500 acre
feet. The Court subtracted this amount from the available supply of
the river which was 288,000 acre feet. The remainder was 15,500 acre-
feet. Therefore, the Court reasoned that the proposed Colorado diver-
sion could not exceed 15,500 acre-feet.60
G. Current Status
1. Colorado v. New Mexico (Colorado 1)61
Colorado v. New Mexico involved a suit by Colorado for apportion-
ment of the Vermejo River.6 2 At the time of the suit, there were no
56. Id. at 457.
57. Id. at 470.
58. 2. R Clark, supra § 132.3 at 331.
59. Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 470 (1921).
60. Id. at 496.
61. 459 U.S. 176 (1982).
62. The Vermejo River is a small, nonnavigable river that originates in the moun-
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uses of the river's water in Colorado and no use or diversion had ever
been made in Colorado.63 The waters of the Vermejo had been fully
appropriated by four New Mexico users.64In 1975, a Colorado corpora-
tion obtained a conditional water right to appropriate water from the
headwaters of the Vermejo River.65 Upon learning of the conditional
water right, the four New Mexico appropriators filed suit in the
United States District Court for the District of New Mexico to enjoin
the proposed diversion.66 The District Court enjoined the proposed
Colorado use on the basis that the New Mexico users were entitled to
have their needs satisfied first because their appropriations were prior
in time.67
In June 1978, Colorado filed suit in the Supreme Court for equita-
ble apportionment of the river. The Court appointed a Special Master
in the case.68 The Master determined that most of the water of the
Vermejo was consumed in New Mexico and if the rule of priority was
strictly applied, Colorado could not be allowed to divert because the
entire flow was required to satisfy the demands of the New Mexico
users.69 Nevertheless, the master applied the doctrine of equitable ap-
portionment and recommended that Colorado be allowed to divert
4,000 acre-feet of water annually from the headwaters of the river.7 0
The Master's recommendation was based on two findings: (1) New
Mexico could compensate for some or all of Colorado's planned diver-
sion through reasonable conservation measures, and (2) Colorado's
benefit would outweigh New Mexico's injury from the diversion.71
The Master found that the Vermejo Conservancy District would be
the only major user to be injured because there was adequate water
for the other New Mexico users.7 2
The Court acknowledged that when "both States recognize the
doctrine of prior appropriation, priority becomes the 'guiding princi-
ple' in an allocation between competing States." 73 The Court, how-
ever, rejected New Mexico's argument that the rule of priority should
control the Court's decision.74 "[T]he just apportionment of interstate
tains of southern Colorado but flows for most of its length in New Mexico. Id. at
177-78.
63. Id. at 178.
64. The four major appropriators were Phelps Dodge Corp., Kaiser Steel Corp., Ver-
mejo Park Co., and the Vermejo Conservancy District. Id.
65. Id. at 178.
66. Id
67. Id. at 178-79.
68. Id. at 179-80.
69. Id. at 180.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 181.
72. Id. at 180.
73. Id. at 183 - 84.
74. Id. at 182-83.
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waters is a question of federal law that depends 'upon a consideration
of the pertinent laws of the contending States and all other relevant
facts.' "75
The Court in Colorado 1 focused attention on waste and ineffi-
ciency in the use of interstate waters. After noting that waste or inef-
ficient use should not be protected 76 the Court said: "We have invoked
equitable apportionment not only to require the reasonable efficient
use of water, but also to impose on States an affirmative duty to take
reasonable steps to conserve and augment the water supply of an in-
terstate stream."77 The Court found that the Master's findings were
not sufficient to determine "the correctness of the Special Master's
application of the principle of equitable apportionment to the facts of
this case." 78 The Court remanded to the Special Master to make fur-
ther findings of fact.79
2. Colorado v. New Mexico (Colorado 11)80
On remand the Special Master denied New Mexico's motion to sub-
mit new evidence. After a review of the previous evidence, the Master
developed additional findings of fact and reaffirmed his original rec-
ommendation that Colorado be allowed to divert 4,000 acre-feet from
the Vermejo River.81 New Mexico filed exceptions to the Master's
second report and the case was argued to the Court on January 9, 1984.
Justice O'Connor, writing for an eight-member majority, sustained
New Mexico's exceptions and dismissed the case.8 2
The Court's rejection of the Master's factual findings in Colorado II
75. Id. at 184 (quoting Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 670-71 (1931).
76. The court said, "Especially in those Western States where water is scarce, 'there
must be no waste .... of the "treasure" of a river... Only diligence and good faith
will keep the privilege alive."' Id. at 184 (quoting Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S.
517, 527 (1936)).
77. Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 183 (1982).
78. Id. at 183.
79. Id. at 189-90. Remand was for specific findings showing:
(1) [H]istorical water shortages or the failure of existing users to de-
velop their uses diligently;
(2) the available supply of water from the Vermejo River... needs of
current users for a continuous supply. The possibilities of equalizing and
enhancing the water supply through water storage and conservation, and
the availability of substitute sources of water....;
(3) the extent to which reasonable conservation measures in both States
might eliminate waste and inefficiency;
(4) the precise nature of the.. .use in Colorado.... and the benefits that
would result... ;
(5) the inju.... that New Mexico would likely suffer as a result of...
such diversion, taking into account the extent to which reasonable con-
servation measures could offset the diversion.
80. 467 U.S. 310 (1984)
81. Id. at 315.
82. Id. at 324.
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is the first equitable apportionment suit in which the Court totally
rejected the Master's findings of fact and conclusions of law. In ad-
dressing the findings of the Special Master, Justice O'Connor said
"though the Master's findings... deserve respect and a tacit presump-
tion of correctness, the ultimate responsibility for deciding what are
correct findings of fact remains with us." 8 3 The majority found that
Colorado's evidence was not specific enough in identifying financially
or physically feasible conservation measures to correct existing ineffi-
ciencies in water usage or the future benefits and efficiencies associ-
ated with the proposed diversion.8 4
In his dissent, Justice Stevens criticized the majority's standard of
"tacit presumption of correctness." 8 5 Justice Stevens acknowledged
that a Master's Report is simply a recommendation and no law re-
quires the Court to give special deference to the Master's findings and
recommendations. In this case, however, Stevens reasoned " [T]he
cause of justice is more likely to be well served by according considera-
ble deference to the Master's factual determinations. The record in
cases such as this is typically lengthy, technical, and complex."8 6
In Colorado I1, Justice O'Connor explained why the Court applied
the clear and convincing standard to Colorado's evidence.8 7 The Court
reasoned that the proposed diverter should bear most, but not all the
risks of erroneous decisions, because the harm to established uses is
more certain, while benefits of a proposed diversion may be specula-
tive.8 8 The Court explained that imposition of "the clear-and-convinc-
ing-evidence standard accommodates society's competing interests in
increasing the stability of property rights and in putting resources to
their most efficient uses."89 The Court noted, "A State can carry its
burden of proof in an equitable apportionment action only with spe-
cific evidence about how existing uses might be improved, or with
clear evidence that a project is far less efficient than most other
projects." 90 The Court concluded that Colorado's proposed diversion
would meet the standard if the evidence showed the high probability
of future benefits or actual inefficiencies in present uses. 91 The Court,
however, found that Colorado had not presented evidence showing it
had taken any reasonable step to minimize the amount of diversion
required.92 The Court also found it persuasive that nine years had
83. Id. at 317.
84. Id. at 317-19.
85. Id. at 326. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
86. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
87. Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 316 (1984).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 320.
91. Id. at 317.
92. Id. at 320.
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passed since the diversion was first proposed and yet no alternatives
for substitute sources were considered or proposed.9 3
In imposing the clear-and-convincing standard, the Court held that
the proponent of the diversion (Colorado) "must bear the risk of error
from the inadequacy of the information available."94 In the Court's
view, Colorado had not "committed itself to any long-term use for
which future benefits can be studied and predicted."95 Colorado had
only established that a steel corporation wanted water for "some un-
identified use in the future."9 6 In dismissing the case and upholding
the existing uses in New Mexico, the Court explained that the require-
ment of long-range planning and analysis will "reduce the uncertan-
ties with which equitable apportionment judgments are made."97
Colorado I and Colorado I indicate that the Court will impose
more stringent conservation measures on both Nebraska and Wyo-
ming in the present controversy. At the minimum, the Court will re-
quire that both states prove water is being or will be put to a
maximum efficient use.
II. EQUITABLE APPORTIONMENT AND NEBRASKA
V. WYOMING 98
In 1934, Nebraska brought an original action in the Supreme Court
for an equitable apportionment of the waters of the North Platte
River. Nebraska brought the suit against Wyoming alleging that di-
versions of water by irrigators in Wyoming were violating the rule of
prior appropriation and depriving Nebraska of water to which appro-
priators in that state were entitled.9 9 Colorado was impleaded as a
defendant and the United States was granted leave to intervene.1 0 0
Nebraska v. Wyoming is considered the most complex equitable ap-
portionment case. For that reason, a historical sketch of the events
preceding the litigation is presented.
A. Background
The North Platte originates in the North Park region of Colorado
and flows through Wyoming and Nebraska before entering the Mis-
souri River at Plattsmouth, Nebraska.101 Climatic conditions in the
river basin range from arid in Colorado and Wyoming to arid and
93. Id.
94. Id. at 323.
95. Id. at 321.
96. Id. at 322.
97. Id.
98. 325 U.S. 589 (1945).
99. Id. at 591-92.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 593-94.
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semi-arid in western Nebraska.102 Some crops in the basin can be
raised without irrigation, but, for the most part, irrigation is indispen-
sable to the agricultural economy.10 3
Irrigation in the river basin began around 1865, with development
more rapid in Colorado and Wyoming until 1909.104From 1910 to 1940,
the acreage under irrigation in Colorado increased 14% that of Wyo-
ming 31%, and that of Nebraska 100%.105 The 100% increase in irri-
gated Nebraska acres can be attributed to the North Platte Project.
The North Platte Project consisted of Pathfinder Reservoir, 10 6 Guern-
sey Reservoir located at Whalen, Wyoming and two small reservoirs
located in Nebraska known as Lake Alice and Lake Minatare.1 07 Also
included in the Project are two main supply canals: the Interstate and
Ft. Laramie Canals which divert water from the North Platte at
Guernsey Reservoir in Wyoming.108 The net result of the North
Platte Project was that water available for irrigation was greatly in-
creased. 109 Although the net result has been an increase in available
water, the Project complicated the problem of administration of the
water between Nebraska and Wyoming. The storage and diversion
works are in Wyoming while most of the beneficial use is in Nebraska.
Thus, appropriators in Nebraska are dependent on control and regula-
tion in Wyoming.110
Until 1931, the supply of water for appropriators in Nebraska, Wy-
oming and Colorado was adequate. The year of 1931 ushered in the
Dust Bowl years drought and the lowest available water supply in the
basin.111
A second federal irrigation project in Wyoming known as the Ken-
drick Project was commenced during this period. Its primary purpose
was to provide irrigation water to 66,000 acres north and west of Cas-
per, Wyoming.112 Nebraska was concerned that the dams constructed
as part of the Kendrick Project would threaten the future water sup-
ply to western Nebraska. Despite the fact that the Kendrick Project
102. Id.
103. Id. at 594.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 594-95 Pathfinder was completed in 1913 and has a capacity of 1,045,000
acre-feet, which is 79 percent of the average annual run-off of the North Platte
River at that point.
107. Id. at 595.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 596. Of the total 174,650 acre increase in Nebraska irrigated acres since 1910,
104,000 acres are North Platte Project lands. Id. at 595 n.5.
110. Id. at 597.
111. Id. at 598. The average mean flow measured at Pathfinder Dam for the period
1904 to 1940 was 1,315,900 acre-feet. From 1930 to 1940, only in one year (1932) did
the flow exceed the mean.
112. Id. at 597.
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was junior to virtually all appropriators downstream, Nebraska's fears
were well-grounded because Wyoming did not recognize any exten-
sion of priorities across state lines.113 Thus, the controversy arose due
to the construction of the Kendrick Project and the effects of a thir-
teen year drought on water supply in the basin.
B. Theories of the Case
In Nebraska v. Wyoming, Nebraska argued that the dispute should
be resolved by applying the prior appropriation rule interstate as the
Court had done in Wyoming v. Colorado.114 Essentially, Nebraska
contended that junior appropriators in Wyoming and Colorado should
be deprived of water for the benefit of senior appropriators in
Nebraska through the operation of a day by day priority
administration.'15
Wyoming urged the Court to make a mass allocation between the
States, without the Court determining the priorities interstate of the
appropriators in each state." 6 The proposal entailed a distribution of
both natural flow and storage water as a common fund to all users.11 7
Wyoming based her theory on the contention that there was sufficient
water available for everyone."s8
In effect, the Court struck a balance between the positions ad-
vanced by Wyoming and Nebraska. The Court rejected Wyoming's
mass allocation theory based on the Master's finding of an inadequate
supply of water for all appropriators since 1931.119 The court, how-
ever, also rejected Nebraska's argument that the priority rule be liter-
ally applied. Relying on the balancing test enunciated in Colorado v.
Kansas, 20 Justice Douglas said, "[I]f an allocation between appropria-
tion States is to be just and equitable, strict adherence to the priority
rule may not be possible."'12
Explaining his reluctance to apply the appropriation rule literally,
Douglas noted, "[T]he economy of a region may have been established
on the basis of junior appropriations. So far as possible those estab-
113. Id. at 609.
114. Id. at 619.
115. Wehrli, Decrees in Interstate Water Suits, 1 Wyo. L.J. 13, 15 (1946).
116. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 620 (1945).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Supreme Court of the United States (No. 7 Original, October Term 1943), Report
of Michael J. Doherty at 117, Special Master for Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S.
589 (1945).
120. 320 U.S. 383, 393-94 (1943). "[In] determining whether one state is using, or threat-
ening to use, more than its equitable share of the benefits of a stream, all of the
factors which create equities in favor of one state or the other must be weighed as
of the date when the controversy is mooted."
121. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 618 (1945).
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lished uses should be protected though strict application of the appro-
priation rule might jeopardize them."122 Also persuasive was the
Master's finding that due to the two to three week flowage time be-
tween Colorado and Nebraska, "if a canal in [Colorado] were closed...
it would be highly speculative whether the water would reach the Ne-
braska appropriator in time or whether the closing of the Colorado
canal would work more hardship there than it would bestow benefits
in Nebraska."123
C. Resolution of the Case
The most difficult part of the case concerned the division of supply
between Wyoming and Nebraska in connection with diversions made
between Whalen, Wyoming, which is 40 miles west of the Nebraska
border, and Tri-State Dam in Nebraska, which is one mile east of the
border.124 In making an allocation between Nebraska and Wyoming,
the Court had to cope with an extremely difficult and complicated sit-
uation arising from storage in the upper state for use in the down-
stream state, and the inter-related problems of priorities of reservoirs
serving lands with 1904 and senior appropriations, and the Kendrick
Project with 1931 and 1934 rights.125 In dealing with this problem, the
Court entered a decree providing as follows with reference to Ne-
braska and Wyoming:
1. Wyoming was enjoined from irrigating more than 153,000 acres from the
North Platte river and tributaries above Pathfinder Reservoir, and from
irrigating more than 15,000 acres from the river between pathfinder Res-
ervoir and Whalen.
12 6
2. Wyoming was enjoined from storing more than 18,000 acre feet in reser-
voirs above Pathfinder Reservoir.
1 2 7
3. Wyoming was enjoined from diverting water into the Casper Canal for the
Kendrick Project or from storing water in Seminoe or Alcova Reservoirs,
other than in accordance with the priorities in relation to senior appropri-
ations of Nebraska lands supplied by the State-line canals, all of which
divert at or above Tri-State Dam in Nebraska.
1 2 8
The Court adopted the Master's recommendation that an appor-
tionment in the Whalen to Tri-State section should be based on a dis-
tribution of natural flow on a percentage of daily flow basis.129 With
reference to the percentage division of the natural flow, the Court
found that if the supply were apportioned between Nebraska and Wy-
oming according to irrigated acres, twenty-seven percent would go to
122. Id. at 618.
123. Id. at 619.
124. Id. at 637-38.
125. Wehrli, supra note 115, at 16.
126. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 623-24 (1985).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 625-26.
129. Id. at 640.
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Wyoming and seventy-three percent to Nebraska; if the division were
based upon acre feet of water historically used, twenty-three percent
would go to Wyoming and seventy-seven percent to Nebraska.30
Thus, the Court apportioned the natural flow supply (storage being
entirely omitted) seventy-five percent to Nebraska and twenty-five
percent to Wyoming during each year for the period May 1 through
September 30.131 The Decree also provided that gauging stations and
measuring devices be installed so that the natural flow could be deter-
mined daily.
The Court permitted the existing Colorado diversions to continue.
The decree enjoined Colorado from irrigating more than 135,000 acres
in the North Park region of the basin, from storing more than 17,000
acre feet during any one season, and from transporting more than
60,000 feet out of the basin in any consecutive ten year period.132
The Court's decree required an apportionment on a percentage ba-
sis of only the natural flow of water between Whalen, Wyoming and
Tri-State Dam. Thus, the general effect of the Decree was to freeze
both Colorado and Wyoming uses at their levels at the time of the suit.
III. THE PRESENT CONTROVERSY
A. Background
In February, 1985, Wyoming Governor Ed Herschler signed into
law a bill authorizing a $45 million appropriation for the development
and construction of a reservoir to be located on Deer Creek, a tribu-
tary of the North Platte River.13 3 The purpose of the reservoir is to
provide water supplies to the city of Casper and other communities
along the North Platte River in southeastern Wyoming.134 Other ben-
efits of the proposed reservoir include new recreation areas, flood con-
trol and an optional hydro-electric power station. 35 The proposed
reservoir would capture water on Deer Creek and would have a stor-
age capacity of approximately 66,000 acre-feet. 3 6 Depending upon op-
130. Id. at 640-41.
131. Id. at 646.
132. Id. at 621-22.
133. Neb. Dept. of Water Resources Fall 1985. Channels pg. 2 (hereinafter Channels).
134. The reservoir is being proposed principally for Casper. Other cities to be supplied
include Evansville, Glenrock and Douglas, Wyoming. Although all four commu-
nities have a need for an additional water supply, Casper is expected to be the
major user. Therefore only Casper's needs for an additional water supply will be
discussed.
135. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Final Environmental Impact Statement: Deer
Creek Reservoir (1987) at 1-3. (hereinafter Final EIS). An enviromental impact
statement is required for Deer Creek pursuant to section 404 of the Clean Water
Act of 1977, which regulates the discharge of dredged or fill material into waters
of the United States.
136. Final EIS at 1.03.
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eration criteria, the reservoir would provide a firm annual yield of
either 6,400 or 9,600 acre-feet of water.1 37 The reason for different op-
erational criteria is that for several years, the operation of the Inland
Lakes (Lake Alice and Lake Minatare) in Nebraska has been the sub-
ject of dispute between Nebraska, Wyoming and the United States Bu-
reau of Reclamation [USBR].138 The disputed issue is whether the
Inland Lakes have a Wyoming water right to accrue the natural flow
of the North Platte River in Wyoming. Wyoming contends that the
USBR has never applied for or secured a permit under Wyoming law
to divert the natural flow at Whalen for the Inland Lakes. The State
of Wyoming petitioned the Federal District Court in Wyoming on Oc-
tober 24, 1986, to enjoin the USBR from diverting water for the Inland
Lakes until the USBR perfects a Wyoming water right permit.139
If the court denies Wyoming's request for an injunction, Scenario I
would assume the USBR's North Platte Project would operate as it
has in the past, including deliveries to the Inland Lakes. The Deer
Creek Reservoir would be allowed to store water only after all senior
water rights have been satisfied and after the Inland Lakes have been
filled.140 The firm annual yield under this scenario would be 6,400
acre-feet.1 41
Scenario 2 assumes that the USBR would have to obtain a water
permit which would have the effect of making the Inland Lakes junior
to the entire North Platte Project including Deer Creek. Thus, the
Inland Lakes would accrue the natural flow of the North Platte River
from surplus natural flow after all senior water rights, including Deer
Creek, have been satisfied.142 If there is insufficient surplus water,
then storage water in the North Platte Project reservoirs would be
used. The Inland Lakes would receive the same amount of water as
they have in the past. The firm annual yield under this scenario
would be 9,600 acre-feet. 143 The overall effect of Deer Creek is an av-
erage annual depletion to the North Platte River of 8,760 acre-feet
under Scenario I and 11,940 acre-feet under Scenario 2.144
Although Deer Creek will provide many benefits for Wyoming,
both Nebraska water users and state government officials are con-
cerned about the implications Deer Creek may have on Nebraska's
North Platte river water rights. The concerns are two-fold. The first
137. Id.
138. The Inland lakes are part of the USBR's North Platte Project and store water for
irrigation uses in Nebraska.
139. Petitioner's complaint at 6, Wyoming v. United States, No. 86-0370 (D. Wyo, filed
by Attorney General McClintock, Oct. 24, 1986).
140. Final EIS at 3.31.
141. Id. at 2.80.
142. Id. at 3.33.
143. Id. at 2.80.
144. Id. at 4.295.
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concern involves the interpretation of the North Platte Decree. Ne-
braska generally considers the flows of all North Platte tributaries, as
well as the North Platte itself, to be governed by the decree. Wyo-
ming, on the other hand, contends that water collected in reserviors
on tributaries is not governed by the decree. Thus, Nebraska fears
that if tributaries are not governed by the decree, the resultant de-
crease in water in the North Platte will reduce the total natural flow
available to be divided between Nebraska and Wyoming according to
the Decree's seventy-five percent - twenty-five percent formula.145
Another concern is if Deer Creek is constructed, it would set a danger-
ous precedent. In effect, Wyoming could construct reservoirs on any
North Platte tributary and the reservoirs would greatly reduce the to-
tal natural flow in the North Platte River.146
Nebraska and Wyoming officials have engaged in numerous meet-
ings in an effort to reach a compromise, but have been unsuccessful in
resolving the dispute over Deer Creek.147 As a result, the State of
Nebraska filed a motion to reopen the original North Platte decree
and a petition for an order enforcing the decree and for injunctive re-
lief.148 The final part of this paper will discuss the issues raised as a
result of Nebraska's petition to reopen the North Platte Decree.
B. Standing.
The Court has consistently required a higher standard of proof in
water disputes between states than in disputes between individuals.149
In previous equitable apportionment cases, the Court set forth the re-
quirement that the petitioning state show by clear and convincing evi-
dence real and substantial injury from the proposed diversion.150
In Colorado I, the Court noted, "New Mexico has met its burden
[of showing real or substantial injury] since any diversion by Colorado,
unless offset by New Mexico at its own expense, [would] necessarily
reduce the amount of water available to New Mexico users."151 On
the basis of Colorado I, the Court appears willing to presume that the
injury standard is met in any case involving a proposed diversion from
an already appropriated stream. If this interpretation is correct, Ne-
braska should satisfy the real and substantial injury standard.
145. Interview with Michael Jess, Director of Nebraska Department of Water Re-
sources (Oct. 16, 1986).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Petitioner's Brief at 1, Nebraska v. Wyoming, No. 6 Original (U.S. Sup. Ct. Oct
Term 1986).
149. Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 323-26 (1984).
150. See supra notes 19-48 and accompanying text.
151. Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 187 n.13 (1982).
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In Nebraska v. Wyoming,1 52 the Court found Nebraska had met
her burden of establishing sufficient injury. The Court said,"The evi-
dence supports the finding of the Special Master that the dependable
natural flow of the river during the irrigation season has long been
over-appropriated. A genuine controversy exists. ' 153 Presumably, a
similar finding will be made in the present case. Nebraska alleges sig-
nificant economic damage amounting to "annual losses of $363,580.00
in increased power costs, $620,046.00 in lost farm income, $1,329,533.00,
in the value of agricultural production, and $3,656,217 in statewide eco-
nomic output."154 The alleged economic damage appears to place Ne-
braska within previous Court apportionment decisions that have
considered damage to dependent economies as proof of real and sub-
stantial injury.155
In the Original Decree, the Court provided for flexibility in the
administration and enforcement of its provisions. In response to Colo-
rado's argument that future North Platte projects might cause reduc-
tions in her water supply, the Court remarked, "If conditions of supply
substantially change, any party can apply for modification of the de-
cree. The decree will not necessarily be for all time. Provision will be
made for its adjustment to meet substantially changed conditions."156
In the original case, the United States contended that regulation of
the tributaries between Pathfinder and Guernsey (Deer Creek is lo-
cated between Pathfinder and Guernsey) was essential due to the pos-
sibility of future storage on the tributaries resulting in a reduction in
tributary flows into the North Platte River.1 57 The Court, however,
rejected the argument citing the Master's finding that "[i]n absence of
evidence showing what.., additional storage projects may be possible
or what their effect might be ... there [is] an insufficient basis for any
present limitation on storage." 5 8 The Court did, however, provide for
a future resolution of the problem: "We find no evidence of any pres-
ent threat to the water supply from this source. If such threat appears
and it promises to disturb the delicate balance of the river, application
may be made at the foot of the decree for an appropriate
restriction."159
152. 325 U.S. 589 (1945).
153. Id. at 608.
154. Petitioners' Brief at 2, Nebraska v. Wyoming, No. 6 Original (U.S. Sup. Ct. Oct.
Term 1986).
155. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945); See Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46
(1907)
156. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 622-23 (1945).
157. Id. at 624. The United States contended the reduction would adversely affect the
amount of water available for storage in the Guernsey, Lake Alice, and Lake
Minatare reservoirs.




Finally, the Court adopted the proposal of the Special Master that
the Court retain jurisdiction.160 Article XIII of the Decree expressly
provides for the Court's retention of jurisdiction to deal with changes
in condition as well as specifically anticipated matters.161 Thus, both
the Court's opinion and its Decree appear to provide that continuing
jurisdiction may be invoked to resolve the alleged harm to Nebraska's
apportionment.
The Court's retention of jurisdiction in the Original Decree ap-
pears to be consistent with precedent. In Arizona v. California 162 the
Court stated that its "purpose in retaining jurisdiction ... can be
gleaned from the respective reports of the Special Masters, which note
the need for flexibility in light of changed conditions and questions
which could not be disposed of at the time of an initial decree."i63
Precedent for retention of jurisdiction was initially established by the
Court in Wyoming v. Colorado164 in which Wyoming petitioned the
Court to enjoin Colorado's diversions claimed to be in excess of that
permitted by the prior decree.l6 5
In the Original Decree, the Court's retention of jurisdiction was
based on the possibility of harm to downstream users as a result of
potential development. Should the Court determine Wyoming's al-
leged present and threatened interference with Nebraska's share of
the apportioned water does harm Nebraska appropriators, Nebraska
should be successful in convincing the Court to exercise its retained
jurisdiction. 66
160. Id. at 655.
161. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945) Equitable Apportionment Decree at 4.
Any of the parties may apply at the foot of this decree for its amendment
or for further relief. The Court retains jurisdiction of this suit for the
purpose of any order, direction, or modification of the decree, or any sup-
plementary decree, that may at any time be deemed proper in relation to
the subject matter in controversy. Matters with reference to which fur-
ther relief may hereafter be sought shall include, but shall not be limited
to, the following-
(c) The question of the effect of the construction or threatened construc-
tion of storage capacity not now existing on tributaries entering the
North Platte River between Pathfinder Reservoir and Guernsey Reser-
voir ....
(f) Any change in conditions making modification of the decree or the
granting of further relief necessary or appropriate.
162. 460 U.S. 605 (1983).
163. Id. at 624.
164. 259 U.S. 419 (1922).
165. Other precedents for retention of jurisdiction can be found in Wyoming v. Colo-
rado, 309 U.S. 572 (1940); Wyoming v. Colorado, 298 U.S. 573 (1936); New Jersey v.
New York, 283 U.S. 336 (1931); and Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U.S. 367 (1929).
166. The Court granted Nebraska's motion for leave to file a petition for an order




C. Future Use and Conservation Measures
The Court in both Colorado I and Colorado II recognized that,
under certain circumstances, the doctrine of equitable apportionment
extends to future diversions even at the expense of existing econo-
mies.167 Prior to these two cases, the Court had never considered a
future use as a basis for equitable apportionment other than a compel-
ling need for municipal drinking water. In Connecticut v. Massachu-
setts168 and New Jersey v. New York,1 69 the Court permitted future
diversions to supply Boston and New York City with additional drink-
ing water. The precedent established in these two cases is important
for Wyoming due to the fact that the purpose and need for the Deer
Creek Reservoir is couched in terms of providing a "sufficient reliable,
long-term municipal water supply for Casper and other
communities."170
Wyoming's decision to use waters of a North Platte tributary for a
municipal water supply seem to be provided for in the language of the
Nebraska v. Wyoming decision. The opinion notes:
The Special Master reports that the parties are agreed that there should be no
restriction upon the diversion... of water for ordinary and usual domestic and
municipal purposes and consumption and that nothing in the recommended
decree is intended to or will interfere with such diversions and uses. Wyo-
ming suggests that that provision cover not only diversions from the North
Platte... but also diversion from its tributaries in those States.... We think
those suggestions are appropriate ones. They will be adopted.1 7 1
Although the language quoted above appears to bolster Wyoming's ar-
gument that diversions from tributaries are allowed for municipal
water supply, Nebraska may contend Casper's compelling need for ad-
ditional water can be mitigated by employing both reasonable conser-
vation measures and by development of alternative water supplies.
Casper's need for an additional municipal water supply is compel-
ling for a number of reasons. A below average water year in Casper is
estimated to occur three out of five years.172Because of the lack of
early water rights for Casper and other communities, in water-short
years, most of their water rights would be out of priority. 7 3 If this
would happen, only 1,460 acre-feet of water per year would be avail-
able. At 1,460 acre-feet per year, an immediate need exists for an addi-
tional firm supply of approximately 9,500 acre-feet of water per year.
By the year 2000, the additional need would be approximately 10,400
167. Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 186-190 (1982); Colorado v. New Mexico, 467
U.S. 310, 323 (1984).
168. 282 U.S. 660 (1931).
169. 283 U.S. 336 (1931).
170. Final EIS at 1.02.
171. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 656 (1945).




acre-feet per year. 74
The greatest demand on Casper's water system is during the sum-
mer months. Between 51 and 68 percent of monthly water use during
the June through September period is for lawn, garden, and park irri-
gation. 75 During the summer of 1981, total water use was reduced by
approximately 17 percent due to implementation of a time-of-day re-
striction on lawn watering.176 The Final EIS concluded if conserva-
tion measures were employed on a strict basis to restrict lawn
watering and other outside uses, the seasonal water demand could be
reduced by 50 percent.177 The Final EIS also determined that pricing
as a conservation measure could result in an estimated 20 percent de-
crease in water use. 78 Despite these conservation savings, the Final
EIS concluded that water conservation measures alone would not be
sufficient to meet demand during a below-average water year.
The Final EIS found, however, that the development of ground
water resources and the aquisition of agricultural water rights are al-
ternatives within the capability of state of Wyoming.179 Casper could
acquire the agricultural water rights either by purchase or condemna-
tion as the need for additional water became necessary.180 The trans-
fer of agricultural rights to municipal use is allowed by Wyoming law
provided that the quantity of water transferred does not exceed the
amount historically diverted or consumptively used.'18 The alterna-
tive of acquiring agricultural water rights was predicated on the need
for a storage facility to capture the flows during the spring run-off
period. Without a storage facility, the effectiveness of this alternative
would be lessened.182
To provide for projected water needs through the year 2015, ap-
proximately 24,000 acres of agricultural land would be affected. 8 3
Although the amount of land appears to be significant, the water
rights could be acquired over a period of time. The firm annual water
supply from this source would be approximately 54,000 acre-feet per
year. 8 4 Cost of acquiring the rights is projected to be $20 million, re-
sulting in a cost of between $60.00 per acre foot of water. 8 5 The cost
of the Deer Creek Reservoir is estimated at $52 million, resulting in a
174. Id. at 1.37.
175. Id. at 1.11.
176. Id. at 2.146.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 2.148.
179. Id. 2.105.
180. Id. at 2.121.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 2.132.
183. Id. at 2.125.




cost per acre-foot of water of $718.00 for a 6,400 acre-foot yield, and
$478 for a 9,600 acre-foot yield.1s6 Thus, the alternative of acquiring
agricultural water rights would result in significantly less cost per
acre-foot of water.
Development of groundwater sources would result in a firm annual
yield of approximately 14,000 acre-feet per year. 8 7 Development of a
groundwater source would require the construction of six wells and 65
miles of pipeline.18 s Although the project cost would be $52 million,
which is higher than either Deer Creek or the cost of agricultural
rights, the cost per acre-foot would be approximately $370,189 which is
less than Deer Creek's cost per acre foot of water.
On the basis of cost comparison, Nebraska has a credible argument
that reasonable conservation efforts and alternative water supplies are
readily feasible alternatives to the Deer Creek project. The duty to
conserve water resources, however, is not imposed without qualifica-
tion. In Colorado 1, the court held that required conservation measures
were limited to those measures that are "financially and physically
feasible" and "within practicable limits"190 On the basis of Colorado I,
the alternatives discussed in the Final EIS will be measured by eco-
nomic and practicable feasibility.
The precedent of Colorado I permits a state's harm to be offset by
reasonable conservation measures.191 In effect, the decision implies
that the Court will not consider harm that occurs due to inadequate
conservation. The duty to conserve extends to both states.192 Thus,
the Court's decision in the present controversy will be influenced by
whether Nebraska can use reasonable conservation measures to offset
the loss of water due to Wyoming's diversion. Even though the equi-
ties supporting the protection of established, senior uses in Nebraska
may be substantial, the Court will consider possible conservation
measures by both Nebraska and Wyoming when balancing the harm
and benefit that might result from the diversion sought by Wyoming.
186. Id. at 2.102.
187. Id. at 2.119.
188. Id. at 2.118.
189. Id. at 2.119.
190. Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 192 (1982) (quoting Wyoming v. Colorado,
259 U.S. 419, 484 (1922)).
191. Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 187 (1982).
192. In discussing the imposition of reasonable conservation measures the Court in
Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 186 (1982), said,
[I]t is entirely appropriate to consider the extent to which reasonable
conservation measures by New Mexico might offset the proposed Colo-
rado diversion and thereby minimize any injury to New Mexico users.
Similarly, it is appropriate to consider whether Colorado has undertaken





In Colorado II, the Court further developed the evidentiary stan-
dard applicable in an equitable apportionment case. In Colorado II,
the Court required New Mexico to show by clear and convincing evi-
dence real and substantial injury from the proposed Colorado diver-
sion.193 The Court will likely require Nebraska to prove the same.
Thus, Nebraska must bear the initial burden of showing that a diver-
sion by Wyoming will cause substantial injury to the interests of Ne-
braska. Nebraska will likely meet this burden, since any upstream
diversion by Wyoming, unless offset by Nebraska through conserva-
tion measures, or reduced use by diverters, will inevitably reduce the
amount of water available to Nebraska users.
Colorado HI requires that once Nebraska proves sufficient injury,
the burden shifts to Wyoming to prove by clear and convincing evi-
dence that reasonable conservation measures could compensate for
some or all of the proposed diversion and that Nebraska's injury
would be outweighed by the benefits to Wyoming resulting from the
diversion. This high standard of proof is justified because existing
economies should be protected and harm to "established uses is typi-
cally certain and immediate, whereas the potential benefits from a
proposed diversion may be speculative and remote."194
In order to carry its burden of proof, Wyoming will need to present
specific evidence proving that existing uses in Nebraska might be im-
proved or that the diversions in Nebraska are far less efficient than
diversions elsewhere. In presenting this evidence, Wyoming must be
able to identify "financial and physically feasible" means by which
Nebraska can eliminate or reduce inefficiency. 95
In Colorado I, the Court was impressed with the fact that New
Mexico had commissioned independent economists to determine both
the direct and indirect effects that the proposed Colorado diversion
would have on New Mexico's population.196 While acknowledging
that the analysis involved prediction and speculation, the Court be-
lieved that New Mexico had taken concrete steps toward determining
effects, while Colorado had not made any specific efforts to determine
impacts.1 97 The Court explained, "Long range planning and analysis
will, we believe, reduce the uncertainties with which equitable appor-
tionment judgments are made."198 Even though Wyoming has the
burden of proof with regard to the proposed use, Nebraska should de-
193. Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 317 (1984).
194. Id. at 316. (quoting Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 187 (1982)).
195. Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 319 (1984).





velop and present evidence of long range planning for efficient use of
the water.
Wyoming must also present evidence of long-range planning as
well as an analysis of the benefits and harms of the diversion.19 9 Spe-
cifically, Wyoming must show the need for the diversion, its impact on
the North Platte, and the conservation measures that will be uti-
lized.200 Based on the reasoning in Colorado II, Deer Creek Reservoir
will be allowed only if Wyoming is successful in proving actual ineffi-
ciencies in present Nebraska uses or that future benefits from Deer
Creek are highly probable and outweigh any harm to Nebraska uses.
CONCLUSION
Many of the Final EIS findings and conclusions were included in
an effort to analyze how the Court will likely address various issues in
the case. Although there is no assurance that a Master will make sim-
ilar findings of facts and conclusions, a review of apportionment case
law indicates it is likely that similar evidence and issues will be
presented to the Court for its consideration.
In applying the doctrine of equitable apportionment in an inter-
state water rights dispute, the Court attempts to resolve the dispute in
a manner that is equitable to all parties involved. Initially applied, the
apportionment analysis simply consisted of an application and analysis
of the contending state's water laws. As state populations increased,
increasing demands were made on the available water supply. Conse-
quently, the Court has found it necessary to search beyond the perti-
nent water laws of the contending states in an effort to equitably
balance the benefits and harms resulting from competing demands.
The search for, and application of, multiple factors considered by
the Court in the apportionment analysis is best illustrated by the
Court's decisions in Colorado I and Colorado I. The two cases will
have significant impact on both Wyoming and Nebraska in the present
controversy. Once Nebraska meets her burden of proving real and
substantial injury, the burden will shift to Wyoming to prove by clear
and convincing evidence that the benefits of the proposed diversion
outweigh injury suffered by Nebraska users. Colorado I and II indi-
cate that the Court may allow Wyoming's proposed diversion if waste
and inefficiency in present Nebraska uses can be proven. Nebraska
and Wyoming will be required to show proof of comprehensive plan-
ning and study to justify existing uses and that efforts are being made
to efficiently manage water resources. Further, the outcome of the
present controversy will likely depend upon evidence presented con-
cerning conservation methods and measures developed by the two
199. Id.
200. Id. at 317-23.
[Vol. 66:734
1987] EQUITABLE APPORTIONMENT 761
states and the emphasis the Court places on the conservation factors
in its apportionment analysis. Judged by Colorado I and II, the em-
phasis is likely to be great.
William D. Olcott '87
